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Abstract	Senior	leaders	from	a	large	American	hospital	told	me	that	they	wanted	their	hospital	to	become	more	“patient-centric”	and	asked	me	to	help	them.		I	was	hired	to	conduct	an	ethnographic	study	of	the	hospital	with	a	team	of	six	employees	and	the	goal	of	improving	patient	experiences.		Sixteen	months	later,	the	research	was	completed,	effective	models	of	hospital	work	practices	documented,	recommendations	made,	and	16	tools	developed	to	improve	hospital	culture.		Yet	none	of	our	work	was	implemented.		I	returned	to	my	field	notes	to	discover	clues	that	might	explain	why.		This	article	explains	the	process	I	followed,	the	stories	that	revealed	unwanted	messages,	the	transcripts	that	enabled	sensemaking,	and	the	program-of-the-month	cycle	that	prevented	implementation	from	occurring.			
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Setting	the	scene	It	had	all	the	makings	to	be	a	critically	important,	well	planned,	appropriately	resourced,	intellectually	challenging,	and	smashing	success!		An	American	hospital	Vice	President	(VP),	charged	with	instituting	organizational	change	processes	including	those	related	to	patients,	contacted	me.		She	indicated	that	her	southern	regional	hospital	wanted	to	become	more	“patient-centric.”		Our	discussions	led	to	a	collaborative	agreement	between	us	for	a	long-term	research	and	implementation	engagement.		I	was	hired	to	work	with	six	employees	to	gather	and	analyze	ethnographic	data,	and	develop,	test,	and	implement	recommendations	and	interventions.		She	assured	me	that	the	senior	staff	and	Chief	Executive	Officer	(CEO)	were	behind	the	effort	and	eager	to	proceed.		We	settled	on	the	overall	goal	of	improving	hospital	patient	experiences	as	a	way	to	help	change	hospital	culture.		She	and	the	CEO	were	the	official	project	sponsors.	Numerous	factors	contributed	to	my	expectation	that	this	project	could	and	would	yield	significant	fruit.		First,	the	VP	struck	me	as	honest	and	forthright,	explaining	the	strengths	of	hospital	culture	(e.g.,	clinical	excellence,	financial	health,	well-liked	CEO)	while	also	divulging	its	weaknesses	(e.g.,	“so	staff	centric,”	“low”	patient	satisfaction	scores).		Second,	I	learned	that	cultural	change	was	to	be	a	core	part	of	the	hospital’s	new	strategic	plan.		Third,	the	VP	asked	me	to	present	at	the	2012	Board	Retreat,	an	invitation	that	suggested	a	high	degree	of	interest	in	strengthening	hospital	culture.		Fourth,	early	conversations	with	staff	portrayed	the	hospital’s	goals	as	consistent	with	national	health	care	trends.		For	example,	I	discovered	that	there	was	strong	support	for	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	Improvement’s	“Triple	Aim”	framework	to	improve	the	experience	of	care,	improve	population	health,	and	reduce	per	capita	health	care	costs	(Berwick,	Nolan,	and	Whittington	2008).		Perhaps	most	significant	in	my	mind	was	the	upcoming	change	in	U.S.	hospital	reimbursement	through	the	Centers	for	Medicare	and	Medicaid	Services	(CMS).		The	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act	(ACA)	specified	that	a	small	proportion	of	hospital	reimbursement	from	CMS	would	be	tied	to	a	weighted	combination	of	clinical	quality	measures	and	patient	perceptions	of	quality	care	(as	indicated	on	the	Hospital	Consumer	Assessment	of	Healthcare	Providers	and	Systems	or	HCAHPS	survey).		The	American	Hospital	Association	estimated	that	up	to	$963M	would	be	redistributed	in	FY	2013	(www.aha.org:content:13:13-linkqualpayment.pdf,	accessed	August	17,	2017)	in	an	effort	to	improve	patient	care.		Higher-performing	hospitals	would	likely	gain,	but	lower-performing	ones	stood	to	lose.		Concerns	across	America’s	hospital	landscape	were	rising	steadily	as	this	anticipated	policy	change	approached.		It	occurred	to	me	then	that	there	had	to	be	a	connection	between	changes	in	hospital	reimbursement	and	this	voiced	interest	at	ABC	Hospital	(a	pseudonym)	in	“patient-centric”	care;	indeed,	if	their	
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patient	satisfaction	scores	were	as	low	as	indicated,	a	potential	funding	crisis	could	be	at	hand.		Nonetheless,	I	could	only	imagine	that	the	change	in	reimbursement	policy	would	work	in	concert	with	a	project	on	cultural	change.	Fast	forward	16	months:		The	Cultural	Change	Team	or	CCT	(composed	of	the	six	employees	and	me),	successfully	completed	the	research	portion	of	the	project,	made	recommendations,	and	created	16	tools	–	all	on	time	and	on	budget.		We	identified	effective	models	of	hospital	work	practices	that	could	serve	as	illustrative	examples	for	areas	of	the	hospital	struggling	to	achieve	their	goals.		We	also	documented	the	specific	ways	in	which	our	research	supported	and	fulfilled	the	objectives	of	the	strategic	plan.		However,	nothing	was	ever	implemented.		Indeed,	we	were	neither	allowed	to	test,	nor	implement,	the	recommendations	and	interventions.		One	day	the	VP	called,	stating	that	the	hospital	had	“decided	to	go	in	a	different	direction”	and	that	it	was	winding	down	the	project.		The	hospital	team	with	whom	I	had	worked	was	dissolved,	leaving	CCT	members	feeling	demoralized.		The	third	and	fourth	quarter	and	final	summary	reports	were	written	and	submitted.		Soon	after,	the	hospital	hired	a	marketing	consultant	to	“energize	the	Cultural	Change	Project.”		
Implementation	processes	Social	and	natural	scientists	have	been	concerned	with	the	application	and	use	of	their	research	approaches	and	findings.		Whole	areas	of	knowledge	have	developed	to	facilitate	the	implementation	of	change	including	those	associated	with	action	research	(Tax	1958;	Argyris	et	al.	1985;	Beer	and	Eisenstat	1996),	community	based	participatory	research	(Bolton	et	al.	2010;	Israel	et	al.	2005;	Maiter	et	al.	2008),	organizational	
development	(Lewin	1947;	Schein	2010;	Cummings	and	Worley	2015),	
diffusion	of	innovations	(Dankowski	et	al.	2011;	Rogers	2003),	culture	as	a	
form	of	motion	(Urban	2010;	Urban	2017),	and	implementation	science	(May	2013;	Nilsen	2015).		Some	recent	research	has	begun	to	address	the	“de-implementation”	or	abandonment	of	practices	that	are	not	evidence-based	(Prasad	and	Ioannidis	2014;	Montini	and	Graham	2015).		Thus,	researchers	and	practitioners	from	many	disciplinary	backgrounds	have	investigated	the	processes,	outcomes,	and	subsequent	evaluations	surrounding	implementation.			In	any	kind	of	implementation,	understanding	the	context	is	critical	(Gaglio	et	al.	2014),	as	is	putting	in	the	necessary	time	and	effort	(Shin	et	al.	2017).		Some	researchers	suggest	the	importance	of	goals	and	measurement	(Neta	et	al.	2015),	while	others	emphasize	timely	and	credible	communication	(Reichers	et	al.	1997)	and	leadership	commitment	(Armenakis	and	Harris	2009;	O’Hagan	and	Persaud	2009).		Darrouzet	et	al.	(2010:	62)	stress	the	value	of	“participatory	
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ethnography”	in	which	staff	serve	as	“paraethnographers”	working	with	the	professional	ethnographers.		In	a	similar	way,	the	participation	by	potential	beneficiaries	(Darrouzet	et	al.	2010;	Armenakis	and	Harris	2009;	Wanous	et	al.	2004)	has	been	cited.		This	tremendous	body	of	research,	implicitly	or	explicitly,	stresses	those	characteristics	that	are	likely	to	raise	implementation	effectiveness,	including	its	acceptance	and	use.	 I	use	this	research	as	a	starting	point	to	make	sense	of	the	CCT’s	experience.		I	initially	believed	that	I	was	at	fault	in	some	way	for	the	failure	of	the	proposed	implementation	processes.		However,	in	analyzing	selected	portions	of	the	field	notes	three	years	after	the	project	ended,	I	came	to	agree	with	the	conclusion	that	CCT	members	expressed	in	the	final	months	of	the	project:		the	planned	organizational-culture	change	would	not	take	hold	at	ABC	Hospital.		This	article	is	a	search	for	explanations	that	encouraged	the	research	along	with	the	delivery	of	recommendations,	interventions,	tools,	and	contributions	to	the	strategic	plan,	but	not	their	implementation.				
Theoretical	framework	
Applying	change	mechanisms	to	solve	problems	Anthropologists	have	long	been	interested	in	the	mechanisms	by	which	cultures	and	cultural	features	emerge,	survive,	change,	or	disappear	(Boas	1920;	Kroeber	1919;	Tylor	1871;	Wissler	1914).		It	is	generally	accepted	that	cultures	change	through	three	important	mechanisms:		invention,	cultural	loss,	and	diffusion.		Acculturation,	a	special	type	of	diffusion,	involves	sustained	contact	between	two	or	more	groups	that	yields	changes	for	one	or	all	groups	over	a	relatively	short	period	of	time	(Berry	1980).		Innovation	is	a	term	connected	with	invention,	though	viewed	more	broadly.		It	may	be	an	idea,	behavior,	or	object	considered	new	“because	it	is	qualitatively	different	from	existing	forms”	(Barnett	1953:	7).		New	ideas	travel	across	cultural	boundaries	via	“diffusion,	acculturation,	and	faddism,”	resulting	in	some	form	of	acceptance	or	rejection	by	the	recipient(s)	(292).		Because	the	primary	focus	for	20th	century	anthropologists	was	community	rather	than	organizational	settings,	much	of	the	foundational	work	on	cultural	change	was	carried	on	by	other	disciplines.		Rogers,	a	rural	sociologist,	spent	much	of	his	career	fine-tuning	his	understanding	of	the	“diffusion	of	innovations,”	focusing	on	communication	channels,	rates	of	adoptions,	and	decision	processes,	among	other	factors	(Rogers	2003).		Psychologists	and	business	management	scholars	have	influenced	how	organizational	cultures	change	over	time.		The	popularity	of	staged-based	process	models	grounded	in	Lewin’s	(1947)	paradigm	(i.e.,	unfreezing,	moving,	and	freezing),	and	readapted	by	Schein	(2010)	and	others,	continues	as	an	important	contribution	to	the	organizational	
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literature.	Indeed,	these	stage-based	models	are	core	to	studies	of	planned	organizational	change	(Armenakis	and	Harris	2009;	Cameron	and	Quinn	2011;	Kotter	1996)	because	of	their	practical	value	in	guiding	the	organizational-change	process	step-by-step.			
	
Anthropological	research	and	implementation	in	organizational	settings	The	discipline	of	anthropology	has	been	undergoing	significant	changes.		Since	problem	solving,	application,	and	practice	have	taken	on	an	increasingly	prominent	place	within	anthropology	(Ginsberg	2016;	Fiske	et	al.	2010;	Rudd	et	al.	2008),	more	professional,	practicing,	and	applied	anthropologists	have	been	involved	in	organizational-change	processes,	design,	and	marketing.	Recent	edited	volumes	highlight	this	work	that	often	reflects	principles	of	action	research	and	community	based	participatory	research	(e.g.,	partnering	with	organizational	insiders	on	all	research	phases,	improving	quality	of	life)	(Cefkin	2010;	Gunn	et	al.	2013;	McCabe	2017;	Nolan	2013).			Anthropological	research	on	planned	organizational	change	by	Briody	et	al.	(2010)	incorporates	the	complementary	roles	of	researcher	and	change	agent.		The	research	is	generally	consistent	with	the	stage-based	and	practical	approach	employed	by	psychologists	and	business	scholars.		An	important	difference,	however,	lies	in	the	unit	of	analysis.		In	the	business	approach,	“altering	individual	attitudes	and	behavior”	is	the	goal	(Ferraro	and	Briody	2017:	195),	while	the	anthropological	approach	is	“organization	focused”	with	attention	on	“work	environment,	workforce,	relationships,	and	work	practices”	(203).		“Organization-focused”	studies	lend	themselves	to	investigations	of	cultural-change	mechanisms	–	innovation,	diffusion,	and	cultural	loss	–	and	the	relationship	among	them.				
Stories	and	new	initiatives:		how	they	appear,	diffuse,	remain,	and/or	
disappear	In	this	article,	two	common	features	of	organizational	culture,	namely	stories	and	new	organizational	initiatives,	are	highlighted.		Both	features	represent	cultural	processes	involving	borrowing	(or	diffusion)	and	disappearance	(or	cultural	loss).		Neither	survives	unchanged	in	an	organization	because	of	connections	to	other	organizational-culture	elements.			Stories	are	typically	“of”	the	organization	and	tend	to	emerge	internally	based	on	actual	or	anticipated	situations	or	events	(Boje	1991).		They	may	be	partially	or	fully	fictitious	and	result	in	multiple	interpretations.		Stories	diffuse	across	employee	networks,	crisscrossing	units,	levels,	and	job	types.		They	serve	various	functions	including	raising	awareness,	problem	solving,	persuasion,	and	reinforcing	ideals	(Connell	
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et	al.	2003;	Jordan	1996;	Orr	1996).		When	two	or	more	stories	are	compared	(e.g.,	illustrating	culturally	appropriate	or	inappropriate	behavior),	the	impetus	for	change	can	be	powerful	(Briody	et	al.	2010;	McKinnon	2008)	and	affect	cultural	change	(Briody	et	al.	2012).		The	acquisition,	learning,	and	transmission	of	stories	are	subject	to	various	forces	(e.g.,	inertia,	drift,	interest)	(Urban	2010;	2017).		For	example,	stories	can	disappear	when	they	are	forgotten,	lost,	or	no	longer	shared.	New	initiatives	are	viewed	as	a	form	of	innovation.		They	usually	reflect	external	trends	–	say,	those	linked	with	quality	improvements	or	current	best	practices.		Disseminated	to	organizational	members	through	the	media,	trade	organizations,	academia,	and	consultants	(Geller	2014),	new	initiatives	can	be	helpful	in	the	production,	distribution,	sale,	and	use	of	products	and	services.		They	represent	hope	to	organizations	because	they	have	been	developed,	tested,	and	implemented	elsewhere.		Their	“aura”	can	also	be	attributed	to	their	novelty	and	often	to	lessons	derived	from	prior	efforts.		Typically,	there	is	some	mutual	adaptation	process	involving	the	innovation	and	the	organization	(Rogers	2003).		However,	an	initiative’s	successful	integration	into	an	organizational	culture	can	be	compromised	and	linked	with	a	cyclical	process	known	as	the	“program	of	the	month”	or	“flavor	of	the	month”	(Best	2006).		Explanations	for	this	cycle,	which	entail	innovation,	diffusion,	and	disappearance	(or	cultural	loss),	include	inattention	to	“learning	organization”	principles	(Shin	et	al.	2017),	inconsistency	with	organizational	identity	and	values	(Cummings	and	Worley	2015),	unclear	rationale	(Geller	2014),	lack	of	“principal	support”	from	organizational	leaders	(Armenakis	and	Harris	2009),	employee	cynicism	(Wanous	et	al.	2004),	and	lack	of	accountability	(O’Hagan	and	Persaud	2009).		Best	(2006:	18)	points	out	that	institutional	fads	are	based	on	the	belief	that	“innovation	represents	progress”	and	that	they	have	a	life	cycle	characterized	by	“emerging,	surging,	and	purging.”		This	seemingly-repetitious	pattern	of	change	creates	organizational	turbulence	in	which	priorities	are	neither	well	founded	nor	well	defined.		For	example,	Herold	et	al.	(2007:	949)	argued	that	leaders	should	not	assume	each	change	is	an	“independent	event”	because	there	is	a	cumulative	effect	of	changes	on	organizational	members.				
Implementation	practice	and	outcomes	I	examine	implementation	practice	defined	as	the	planning	and	execution	of	organizational	change	by	key	stakeholders.		Two	stories	and	selected	program-of-the-month	initiatives	in	a	“silo-ed”	or	decentralized	organization	(Diamond	et	al.	2004;	Lencioni	2006)	become	the	lens	for	this	exploration.		My	goal	is	to	identify	elements	that	prevented	the	implementation	of	recommendations	and	interventions	so	that	it	is	possible	to	explain	why	“a	cohesive	pattern	of	change	in	an	organizational	
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culture”	(Briody	et	al.	2010:	8)	was	not	achieved.			Few	lessons	or	current	best	practices	are	available	to	guide	anthropologists	in	the	specifics	of	implementation	practice.		Skilled	incorporation	of	anthropology’s	virtues	(e.g.,	ethnographic	approach,	contextual	understanding)	combined	with	minimization	of	communication	issues	with	stakeholders	(e.g.,	use	of	accessible	language,	focus	on	relevant	problems,	provision	of	recommendations)	certainly	can	help	enhance	practice	effectiveness	(Closser	and	Finley	2016).		However,	those	elements	alone	offer	insufficient	insight	into	implementation	failure.		It	is	now	time	to	move	beyond	the	understanding	and	explanation	that	research	can	provide,	to	an	understanding	and	explanation	of	
implementation	and	its	outcomes.		I	address	the	following	questions:		
• What	can	we	learn	about	organizational	culture	from	stories	and	new	initiatives?	
• What	do	stories	and	new	initiatives	reveal	about	change	processes	within	organizational	culture?		
• How	should	organizational-culture	change	be	encouraged	in	silo-ed	organizations?			
• How	can	we	expand	our	understanding	of	implementation	practice?			
Methods	The	research	design	employed	an	ethnographic	approach,	crafted	to	contain	a	mix	of	techniques:		in-depth	interviews	and	conversations,	observation,	participation	at	meetings,	and	documents	and	digital	materials.		The	project	period	extended	over	17	months	in	2012	and	2013;	a	few	additional	conversations	and	email	exchanges	with	hospital	employees	occurred	since	then.				
The	cultural	change	team	at	ABC	Hospital	The	six	ABC	Hospital	employees	were	experienced	professionals	with	backgrounds	that	complemented	anthropological	research	and	application	(e.g.,	industrial	psychology,	organizational	development,	nursing).		Four	worked	in	Organizational	Improvement	and	two	were	employed	in	Human	Resources.		They	served	as	hospital	analysts,	managers,	and	directors.		Three	of	them	had	participated	in	“Contextualist™”	training	offered	by	VHA,	Inc.,	a	national	healthcare	network.		The	training	included	practice	in	a	variety	of	qualitative	methods	(e.g.,	observation,	clustering	themes,	story	collecting,	metaphors)	and	data	gathering	and	reporting	topics	(e.g.,	bias,	induction,	framing,	drawing	conclusions).		
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	 Collaborating	with	this	team	was	particularly	helpful;	each	member	had	unique	perspectives	and	experiences	at	ABC	and	could	offer	specific	insights	and	explanations	for	emerging	patterns.	Because	team	members	had	worked	at	ABC	Hospital	for	many	years,	their	work	relationships	were	extensive.		Having	access	to	their	networks	facilitated	data	collection,	as	well	as	validation	of	emerging	patterns.		Together,	we	(the	CCT)	developed	six	PowerPoint	reports	that	included	four	quarterly	reports,	one	Board	report,	and	one	final	summary	report.		Separately,	I	prepared	two	pre-contract	reports	for	Board	members	and	hospital	leaders.		The	CCT	also	created	16	problem-solving	and	cultural	transformation	“tools”	that	targeted	hospital	cultural	issues	and	employee	engagement	with	patients	and	family	members.						
Data	collection	Table	1	illustrates	our	key	data	collection	techniques.		We	conducted	137	interviews	with	hospital	employees	that	lasted	45	minutes	on	average;	prior	to	signing	the	hospital	contract,	I	conducted	some	preliminary	interviews	and	observations	as	well.		(The	consulting	contract	limited	my	interaction	to	employees;	I	was	not	free	to	speak	with	patients.)		Typically,	the	interviews	were	done	one-on-one,	although	there	were	occasional	group	interviews.		We	interviewed	across	all	employee	ranks	and	functional	areas	(e.g.,	nursing,	environmental	services,	surgery,	pharmacy).		We	used	open-ended	questions	to	gather	descriptions	and	viewpoints	of	hospital	culture.		Questions	used	repeatedly	included:	
• What	is	a	typical	or	composite	day	for	you?	
• Please	give	me	a	list	of	everything	that	is	important	to	patients	during	their	hospital	stay.	
• What	do	you	consider	to	be	an	ideal	patient	experience?			
• How	does	your	ideal	description	of	the	patient	experience	differ	from	the	current	state?	
• What	aspects	of	patient	flow	are	working	well	compared	to	those	needing	improvement?			
• To	what	extent	is	wait	time	a	problem	in	your	unit?		
• What	could	be	done	to	reduce	patient	wait	time	when	other	units	are	involved?					
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	 Interviews	 Meetings	 Observations	Number	 137	 55	 57	Hours	 102	 80	 81	
Table	1:		Type	of	Data	Collection	Techniques	by	Number	and	Hours		 We	took	extensive	notes	during	our	meetings	with	hospital	staff,	and	our	observations	of	them	as	they	worked.		Taken	together,	the	number	of	hours	that	we	spent	in	meetings	and	engaged	in	observation	totaled	over	160	(See	Table	1).		We	attended	a	variety	of	meetings,	some	of	which	were	regularly	scheduled	(e.g.,	patient	experience	team,	staff	meetings).		Our	observations	occurred	in	various	hospital	units	and	at	a	new	employee	orientation.		We	also	gathered	a	wide	range	of	pertinent	documentary	and	digital	materials.		Among	them	were	hospital	mission,	vision,	and	value	statements,	patient	satisfaction	surveys,	employee	surveys,	hospital	newsletters	and	email	blasts,	meeting	agendas,	hospital	programs,	and	annual	reports.		
Data	analysis	We	transcribed	our	handwritten	notes	and	shared	our	work	within	the	CCT.		We	used	content	analysis	to	identify	themes	and	patterns.		For	example,	we	created	master	files	documenting	categories	such	as	employee	hypotheses	about	ABC	culture	and	hospital	success	stories.		We	triangulated	across	our	various	data	collection	techniques,	sample,	and	CCT	researchers.		Given	that	CCT	members	possessed	different	disciplinary	and	functional	knowledge,	we	were	able	to	ask	our	questions,	draw	our	inferences,	and	test	our	hypotheses	with	each	other	–	first.		That	process	gave	us	confidence	in	what	we	were	learning	and	prepared	us	to	discuss	it	with	a	broader	cross-section	of	the	hospital	staff.	The	two	stories	analyzed	here	reflect	the	contributions	of	the	CCT.		They	focus	on	patient	flow,	a	critical	ABC	issue.		The	Flow	Story	and	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked,	respectively,	are	based	on	statements	drawn	from	the	entire	data	set.	A	subsequent	discourse	analysis	of	sponsor	reactions	to	the	two	flow	stories	is	based	on	two	particular	discussions.		One	meeting	was	called	by	the	VP	to	review	the	content	of	the	first	of	four	quarterly	reports,	while	the	other	involved	presenting	the	first	quarterly	report	to	both	the	CEO	and	VP.		The	attitudes	and	behavior	that	the	VP	and	CEO	expressed	related	to	organizational-culture	change	were	validated	by	other	field	data.		
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The	flow	story	
Patient	flow	through	the	hospital	When	individuals	arrive	at	a	hospital	needing	care,	whether	through	Admissions	or	the	Emergency	Department	(ED)	–	often	referred	to	as	the	Emergency	Room	(ER)	–	they	become	part	of	a	process	called	“patient	flow.”		Flow	is	a	somewhat	standardized,	yet	customized,	sequence	of	steps	in	patient	diagnosis	and	treatment;	it	ends	at	discharge.		Flow	was	a	significant	issue	for	ABC	Hospital.		Bottlenecks	frequently	occurred	as	staff	tried	to	balance	the	often-unpredictable	influx	of	patients	with	the	appropriate	number	of	staff	and	available	beds.		When	the	project	was	initiated,	wait	times	to	consult	with	a	physician	and,	if	admitted,	secure	a	bed	on	a	hospital	floor	could	be	protracted	–	up	to	20	hours,	eight	hours	on	average	–	as	could	patients	going	to	or	returning	from	surgery,	or	patients	waiting	to	be	discharged.		Such	bottlenecks	negatively	affected	comments	about	the	patient	experience,	contributed	to	low	patient	satisfaction	scores	(i.e.,	HCAHPS),	and	lower	than	expected	CMS	reimbursement.		The	CCT	focused	part	of	its	research	on	how	employees	understood	patient	flow.				
A	consensus	view	of	the	flow	story		As	one	nurse	stated,	“I	mean	we	all	hear	stories	like	‘The	bed	was	clean	three	hours	ago	and	it	hasn’t	been	changed	in	the	computer!’	or	‘You	have	to	wait	until	after	the	change	of	shift.		We	can’t	take	report	now.’”		After	eliciting	employee	narratives	of	patient	flow,	a	consensus	view	emerged.		Indeed,	employee	perceptions	were	based	on	experiences	in	their	own	unit.		Sometime,	a	powerful	upstream	unit	was	said	to	be	responsible:	…if	people	said	they	couldn’t	handle	it	and	were	running	around	like	chickens	with	their	heads	cut	off,	the	charge	(nurse)	would	say,	‘My	nurses	are	saying	they	just	can’t	handle	that	patient.’		And	the	response	we	would	get	from	the	ER	was,	‘It	doesn’t	matter.		The	patient	has	to	come	(to	you)	in	15	minutes	and	you	are	taking	the	patient	anyway,	regardless	of	what	your	feelings	are….’		Yet,	we	found	criticism	traveled	freely	across	all	organizational	units:			
• “An	admitting	physician	will	come	down	here.		It	could	be	20	minutes.		It	could	be	two	hours...The	patient	just	sits	here…and	we	can’t	explain	what’s	going	on.		It’s	an	uncomfortable	position	for	the	(ED)	staff….”		
• “I	don’t	think	the	floors	understand…that	when	they	have	five	patients	that	are	set	for	discharge	and	they	put	all	five	patients	in	the	computer	minutes	after	each	other,	how	that	really	affects	the	flow	from	(the	Patient	Transport	Department)	standpoint.”		
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Employee	attitudes	and	behaviors	related	to	flow	Complaints	varied	but	seemed	to	relate	generally	to	an	inability	to	control	the	amount	and	pace	of	work.		For	example,	note	the	highly	evaluative	words	(in	bold)	used	in	these	quotes:		
• “The	greater	the	capacity,	the	more	frustration	and	gridlock	and	
stress	and	inability	to	move	the	patient…when	we	get	up	to	100%	(capacity)	you	get	increased	resistance.”		
• “As	a	bedside	person,	you	are	put	in	the	vise	of	doing	more	work	and	then	being	criticized	for	the	patient	experience	and	...	you	have	proportionately	less	time	to	pay	attention	to	all	the	patients	you	already	have!”	These	specialized	terms	(in	bold)	stand	out	because	they	can	evoke	unpleasant	visual	images	and/or	because	an	irritable	tone	of	voice	(e.g.,	of	anger,	exasperation)	is	apparent.		Staff	took	actions	to	level	the	patient	flow	through	their	units.		Some	simply	resisted.		Here	is	a	relatively	common	strategy	of	slowing	down	the	work:	
• “…let’s	say	I’m	taking	care	of	four	patients	and	patient	A	is	admitted	upstairs.		But	I	know	if	I	get	rid	of	patient	A,	I’m	going	to	get	another	patient	and	that	is	going	to	be	more	work.		So,	I	drag	my	feet	and	I	don’t	send	my	patients	up	as	quickly	as	I	could…”	
• “…a	nurse’s	station	hold(s)	off	on	a	discharge	or	delay(s)	a	discharge	in	order	to	prevent	a	new	patient	from	coming	to	their	floor	because	it’s	almost	change	of	shift…”		By	contrast,	other	employees	engaged	in	problem	solving.		Their	strategies	were	adaptive	to	the	bottlenecks.		They	often	pitched	in	to	assist	when	it	was	not	among	their	assigned	duties	as	in	this	example:	Yesterday,	I’m	walking	down	the	hallway	and	I	see	a	patient	…	(who	asks)	‘Can	somebody	take	me?		Where’s	my	ride?’		And	I’m	like,	‘Oh	no.		We	(nursing	unit	X)	can’t	have	that.’		So,	I	made	sure	to	cancel	the	transportation	request	and	we	took	the	patient	down.		A	lot	of	times	that’s	what	we’ll	do.			
Suggested	employee	solutions	for	flow	The	Flow	Story	offers	insights	into	problem	solving	from	the	vantage	point	of	those	directly	affected	by	the	bottlenecks	and	staff	shortages.		Several	themes	appeared	in	the	proposed	solutions,	all	of	which	add	to	our	understanding	of	ABC	Hospital	culture.				
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One	theme,	accountability,	appeared	in	this	potential	solution:	“I	think	it’s	getting	on	the	same	sheet	and	measuring	and	monitoring	and	holding	accountable	every	part	of	the	system	where	there	is	a	flow	problem.		You	identify	it.		You	drill	down....”		The	salience	of	weak	accountability	was	validated	in	an	examination	of	my	field	notes	during	the	first	month	of	the	project.		I	analyzed	the	number	of	freely-elicited	mentions	of	the	hospital’s	official	values:		integrity,	compassion,	accountability,	respect,	and	excellent.		The	term	“accountability”	appeared	23	times	(61	percent)	among	the	38	mentions,	and	always	reflected	the	
lack	of	accountability	in	ABC	culture	(e.g.,	“There	was	no	accountability	for	the	action	plans”).	A	second	theme,	employee	empowerment,	was	evident:	“The	flow	issues…really	can	get	fixed	by	the	people	at	the	bottom	if	somebody	gives	them	the	vision,	gives	them	the	mandate	to	get	the	job	done,	and	gives	them	the	opportunity	to	do	it.		But	we	try	to	drive	change	from	the	top.”		It	is	evident	that	employee	empowerment	is	fragile	and	not	routinely	the	norm.		More	common	in	the	data	set	were	numerous	concerns	about	the	“scrutiny”	as	well	as	the	“gatekeeping”	mechanisms	in	place.			
• “We’re	waiting	for	people	(leaders)	to	say,	‘This	can	be	done!’		
• “That	(survey	tool)	still	needs	to	be	approved	by	everybody	and	their	pet	puppy.”		Moreover,	employees	also	expressed	their	hopes	for	a	future	ideal	ABC	culture	in	which	empowerment	was	pervasive:		
• “Everybody	has	a	role…this	is	about	all	of	us.”	
• “Grassroots…it	(problem	solving)	should	start	from	the	bottom	up.”	The	theme	of	collaboration	also	was	among	the	recommendations	employees	offered.		We	saw	examples	of	it,	particularly	during	stressful	times	(e.g.,	during	a	patient	“surge,”	during	a	combined	patient	surge	and	trauma	incident):	
• Nurse:	“Holler	at	me	if	you	need	me.		I	can	do	Triage	or	Unit-3	or	whatever.”	
• Charge	Nurse:	“Have	you	eaten	yet?”	
• Nurse:	“No.”	
• Charge	Nurse:	“What	can	I	do	for	you	so	you	can	(eat)?”	
• Floor	7A	sent	down	a	(medical)	tech	(to	the	ED)	to	transport	a	
patient	to	be	admitted	to	7A.		(Observer	Notes)						
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Self-optimization	as	ABC’s	current	cultural	model		ABC	Hospital’s	cultural	model	emerges	in	the	Flow	Story.		Individuals	and	units	optimize	for	themselves	rather	than	for	the	whole.		Indeed,	the	Flow	Story	is	emblematic	of	a	silo-based	organizational	culture:	
• “The	rules	are,	‘Stay	in	your	own	lanes	until	you	are	asked	in.’”		
• “Some	say,	‘My	area	did	just	fine	and	that’s	all	I	care	about.’”	Validation	of	this	culture	can	be	found	in	the	terms	and	phrases	used	frequently	at	ABC:	“kingdom,”	“fiefdom,”	“turf,”	“territorial,”	“handoff,”	“hurdle,”	and	“bed	dumping,”	to	name	a	few.		Organizational	inconsistencies	are	particularly	noticeable	at	unit	boundaries	(e.g.,	ED	and	floors)	where	work	rules,	practices,	and	processes	vary.		Participation	in	a	silo-ed	culture	may	be	neither	desirable	nor	preferable:	“Right	now	we	don't	play	well,	or	communicate	(but)	we	want	to	be	part	of	the	solution.”		However,	the	Flow	Story	suggests	that	adherence	to	a	common	set	of	organization-wide	goals,	processes,	and	structures	is	weak	at	best.				
The	story	of	flow	unlocked		The	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked,	like	the	Flow	Story,	is	a	composite	depiction	of	patient	hospital	care.		It	describes	organizational	boundaries	where	bottlenecks	have	been	mitigated	so	that	flow	can	proceed.		This	story	represents	the	intersection	of	two	or	more	units	working	together	on	behalf	of	the	patient.		We	found	several	examples	of	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked	as	patients	entered	the	hospital	system,	were	transferred	within	it,	or	were	discharged	from	it.		
Goal:	relieving	bottlenecks		One	version	of	the	story	concerns	a	small	subunit	that	“changed	hands	several	times	and	historically	it	fell	into	that	Med/Surge	overflow.”		When	capacity	was	high	(i.e.,	all	regular	beds	were	filled),	patients	could	be	assigned	there.		During	our	project,	this	subunit	became	part	of	the	ED	and	was	renamed	the	ADT	(Admissions,	Discharge,	and	Transfer)	unit:	“…if	a	patient	is	ready	for	admission	(from	the	ED),	and	the	bed	or	the	staff	(on	the	particular	floor)	is	not	ready,	the	patient	will	go	to	ADT.		A	hospitalist	(i.e.,	physician)	will	be	there	to	write	orders	(to	get	the	patient’s	care	started).”	A	dedicated	physician	and	two	nurses	staffed	the	ADT.		The	patient	left	the	ADT	as	soon	as	a	bed	on	the	appropriate	floor	became	available.	This	small	subunit	had	always	acted	as	a	buffer	–	whether	as	a	Med/Surge	overflow	unit	or	the	ADT.		In	both	cases,	it	enabled	staff	to	handle	a	rise	in	patient	numbers.		When	the	hospital	reached	capacity,	the	
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beds	in	this	subunit	could	be	made	available.		ADT	differed	from	the	Med/Surge	overflow	unit	in	its	number	of	functions,	including	admissions	and	discharge.		The	ADT	accepted	those	patients	who	were	going	to	be	admitted	from	the	ED	waiting	room	so	that	their	care	could	begin,	and	also	assisted	with	patient	discharges	from	the	floors.		Keeping	the	flow	of	patients	moving	freed	up	beds	for	incoming	patients.			
Strategies	to	unlock	flow	The	two	managers	–	one	in	charge	of	the	ER	and	the	other	of	flow	hospital-wide	–	faced	a	number	of	challenges	in	arresting	flow	bottlenecks.		In	particular,	they	had	to	figure	out	how	to	bridge	organizational	boundaries.		They	knew	unlocking	flow	was	contingent	upon	motivating	other	units	to	cooperate	and	work	differently.		Fortunately,	their	Nursing	VP	was	strongly	supportive	of	their	ideas,	and	peers	and	subordinates	viewed	them	as	likeable	and	respected.	Examples	of	their	statements	illustrate	their	determination	and	blunt	and	honest	approach	in	generating	buy-in:		
• “(To)	the	Pharmacy,	Radiology,	Lab,	I	said,	‘We’re	going	to	have	extra	taxing	stuff	on	you.		We’re	going	to	expect	you	to	turn	over	these	orders	relatively	quick	…	Is	this	something	you’re	willing	to	do?’”			
• “The	ancillaries	–	Lab,	Radiology	–	never	balked	once.		They	said,	‘Okay,	we’ll	treat	ADT	as	an	extension	of	the	ER.		We’ll	give	you	the	turnaround	times	that	we	give	you	down	there.’		And	they	lived	up	to	it.”	Both	managers	appreciated	experimentation	and	metrics,	building	the	evidence	base,	and	learning	from	results.		They	cemented	organizational	connections	by	displaying	progress.		They	also	articulated	the	potential	of	cross-unit	partnerships:		the	ability	to	traverse	organizational	boundaries	across	any	set	of	hospital	silos:		We’re	really	excited	about	it.		And	to	me	the	exciting	part	is	not	just	looking	at	what	the	ADT	is	capable	of	doing	–	it’s	that	I	know	we	can	replicate	that	anywhere	in	the	building.		And	that’s	my	ultimate	vision	of	this	…	to	say,	‘Yeah,	we	did	it	over	here,	but	you	can	do	it	over	there.’			
Contrasting	viewpoints:		benefits	and	shortcomings				Versions	of	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked	expressed	employee	excitement,	motivation,	and	high	energy.		Employees	identified	particular	advantages	of	the	ADT	including	reduced	patient	wait	time,	faster	patient	care	under	surge	conditions,	and	shared	discharge	responsibilities	for	units.		
• “We	got	the	patient	to	a	quiet,	safe	environment.”			
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• “We	utilized	ADT	last	week	…	There	were	12	patients	we	were	able	to	get	off	the	floors	quicker	because	they	were	able	to	go	there	while	they	waited	for	transportation.				
• “The	ADT	nursing	staff	helps	tremendously!	…	When	they	are	free	(to	do	admission	or	discharge	paperwork),	it	frees	us	(Unit	X)	up	
soooo	much.		It’s	great.”	Employees	believed	that	ABC’s	patient	satisfaction	scores	would	improve.		Their	beliefs	were	borne	out	as	the	ADT	pilot	soon	transformed	into	a	permanent	hospital	unit.				Yet,	some	staff	expressed	skepticism	about	ADT’s	benefits.		Some	floor	staff	resisted	using	both	the	ADT	as	well	as	its	“roving	nurses”	to	assist	with	patient	discharge:	
• “So,	they	want	to	move	the	patient	to	ADT	and	then	move	them	to	(Unit	X)	or	another	unit	when	they	get	a	bed	available,	and	I	think	…	‘That’s	three	beds,	two	moves,	but	whatever’s	good	for	the	flow!’”	
• “There’s	some	other	floors	that	are	not	transparent	in	what	they	do,	and	they	refuse	to	let	us	(roving	nurses)	come	…	You	(floor	staff)	know	when	that	patient	leaves,	you	are	going	to	get	another	patient.		So,	we’re	not	even	allowed	on	that	floor.”	Others	suggested	that	interference	with	ADT’s	charge	was	underway:	“…the	purpose	of	the	ADT	is	good…Trying	to	make	it	work	and	dealing	with	the	staff	frustrations	associated	with	it	is	a	challenge.		Last	week	when	we	were	at	a	high	capacity,	it	was	used	as	a	holdover	area.”				
Optimization	of	the	whole	as	ABC’s	imagined	future	cultural	model	An	ideal	cultural	model	for	an	imagined	future	appears	in	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked.		A	“changed	vision”	designed	to	“tackle	the	high-priority	areas”	where	flow	blockages	occurred	guided	hospital	activity	and	involved	the	following	key	elements:	
• Middle	management	outreach:	“We	win	together.”	
• An	invitation	to	participate:	“Jump	right	on	board!”	
• Experimentation	and	testing	to	counter	resistance:	“(We	are)	no	stronger	than	the	weakest	link	in	our	chain.”	
• Selected	senior	leadership	support:	“Challenge	what	we	are	used	to	doing.”				
Sponsor	reactions	to	the	flow	stories	Long	after	the	CCT	project	ended,	I	undertook	a	discourse	analysis	of	two	meetings	with	the	project	sponsors	(i.e.,	the	VP	and	CEO)	to	present	the	
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findings	from	our	first	quarterly	report	and	gather	their	feedback.		The	February	2013	meeting	involved	the	VP,	who	wanted	to	review	the	findings	in	advance;	all	CCT	members	attended.		Approximately	one	month	later,	I	presented	a	revised	PowerPoint	deck	to	both	the	CEO	and	VP;	CCT	members	were	not	invited.		These	meetings	occurred	approximately	halfway	through	the	project’s	trajectory.		Two	of	the	spheres	in	the	center	of	Figure	1	are	highlighted	to	reflect	these	meetings.		The	delivery	of	PowerPoint	reports	is	depicted	by	triangles.																
Figure	1:		Project	Sponsor	Interactions	and	Reports	by	Phase		 Figure	1	also	illustrates	the	positioning	of	these	two	meetings	within	the	context	of	all	key	interactions	with	the	VP	and	CEO	during	the	program.		I	return	later	to	describe	other	attributes	of	this	figure.		
	
VP’s	emphasis	on	themes	The	VP	(Chloe)	indicated	that	we	would	review	our	work	with	her	first,	and	later	with	the	CEO	(Mitchell).		(All	names	are	pseudonyms).		For	the	February	meeting,	I	joined	the	Chloe	and	the	six	CCT	members	by	conference	call.		This	particular	discussion	lasted	55	minutes.		Chloe	began	talking	almost	immediately:		I	don’t	think	it’s	on	track	…	I	know	what	Mitchell	is	looking	more	for	…	what	themes	we	think	exist	in	this	organization	and	how	we	vetted	those,	at	least	in	flow,	and	confirmed	them	at	a	leadership	level	…	Holly,	did	you	send	the	themes	report	to	Elizabeth?		He’s	looking	more	for	the	themes	and	what	evidence	did	we	find	of	that	
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–	whether	we’ve	gotten	to	them	all	or	not.			Themes	appeared	to	be	highly	salient	for	Chloe.	I	wondered	why	identifying	“all”	themes	would	be	useful?		Later	I	realized	that	the	“Contextualist”	training	that	she	and	about	30	others	from	ABC	had	taken	involved	stressed	themes.		In	particular,	the	training	focused	primarily	on	the	identification	of	themes	rather	than	their	explanation,	impact,	or	problem-solving	potential.		It	is	likely	that	Chloe	had	no	practice	in	understanding	ABC’s	cultural	themes	in	relation	to	hospital	issues	and	no	practice	in	formulating	policy	to	address	hospital	issues	based	on	the	themes.			
VP’s	counterarguments	to	the	stories				
Methodology	concerns	voiced	A	combined	admonition-denunciation	of	the	two	flow	stories	characterized	Chloe’s	comments	as	she	called	into	question	our	methodology:		
• Interview	sample:	“I	had	some	real	questions	about	the	quotes	…	I	was	told	by	the	team	that	they	only	interviewed	leadership,	but	these	are	like	staff-level	comments.”		
• Flow	Story	not	validated	with	actual	behavior:	“It’s	like	citing	the	behavior	that’s	happening	that	you	don’t	really	know	is	happening.”	
• Definition	of	a	story:	“I	have	a	problem	with	the	ADT	Story	and	I’ll	tell	you	why…	ADT	has	existed	as	about	56	different	animals	for	the	last	five	years.		What	you	have	here	as	far	as	the	innovation	is	about	two	weeks	of	pilot.		I	don’t	think	there	is	a	story	yet.”	All	three	statements	fault	us	for	inappropriate	analyses.		In	the	first	two,	Chloe	argues	that	we	made	errors	in	sampling	(because	the	results	were	unexpected)	and	in	quality	control	(because	without	comparing	a	story	to	actual	behavior,	it	is	impossible	to	know	the	story’s	accuracy).		In	the	third	statement,	Chloe	insists	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked	cannot	count	as	a	story	(because	it	is	too	new	and	its	long-term	outcomes	are	unknown).		
Beliefs	in	leadership	misaligned	with	leadership	performance	in	the	flow	
story	Chloe’s	second	critique	revolved	around	our	findings	from	the	Flow	Story	analysis	and	their	implications	for	ABC’s	culture.		She	returned	five	times	to	our	analysis	(see	time	stamps):		
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• At	3:52:	“So	is	this	a	leadership	thing	–	what	they	think	the	staff	is	doing?		Because	we’re	in	big	trouble	if	that’s	what	this	is	–	I	mean	big	trouble	with	the	culture!”	
• At	4:51:	“I‘d	fire	them	–	the	leader	that	said	this	because	they	know	this	problem	is	existing	that’s	impeding	patient	care	and	they’re	not	stopping	it?		That’s	their	goal	as	a	leader!”	
• At	13:48:	“I’ll	tell	you,	as	an	Executive	Team	member,	when	I	saw	this,	I	wanted	to	go	and	fire	the	whole	lot…If	this	is	your	perception	of	leadership,	if	this	is	what	is	going	on,	if	we	as	leadership	are	not	stopping	it?”	
• At	36:14:	“If	this	is	what	leaders	are	saying	happen	that	other	people	do,	this	is	a	terribly	compelling.”	
• At	36:56:	“These	other	quotes	are	absolutely	heart-sickening	when	I	find	out	that	they’re	not	somebody	admitting	to	their	own	behavior,	but	it’s	somebody	saying	what	they	think	somebody	else	said.”			Chloe’s	interpretation	of	the	Flow	Story	evolves.		She	seems	to	exhibit	disbelief	and	alarm	in	the	first	statement,	followed	by	anger	in	the	second	and	third,	resignation	in	the	fourth,	and	dismay	and	bewilderment	in	the	last	statement.		In	the	end,	she	appears	to	have	come	to	terms	with	the	Flow	Story’s	validity.			
Cost	effectiveness	in	the	story	of	flow	unlocked		Similarly,	our	VP	was	upset	about	our	selection	of	the	ADT	as	an	example	of	Flow	Unlocked:	
Chloe:		I	think	this	can	be	appendix	material,	as	a	potential	future	story.		But,	I	think	that	it	(ADT)	could	grow	up	to	be	as	bad	for	us	as	it	might	look	good	right	now	…	while	all	of	them	pin	their	hopes	on	this	pilot	as	a	way	of	reducing	silos,	it’s	run	for	two	weeks!			
Elizabeth:		Well,	it’s	less	about	the	story	–	it’s	less	about	ADT	–	and	more	about	the	idea	of	a	buffer,	which	allows	the	flow	to	move.		And	when	the	flow	is	able	to	move,	it	reduces	the	bottleneck,	and	it	enhances	patient	satisfaction,	and	it	breaks	down	silos.	
Chloe:		And	it	(ADT)	adds	significantly	to	the	cost	of	each	patient’s	care	in	a	way	that	I’m	not	sure…the	organization	can	bear,	simply	because	we	haven’t	unclogged	or	solved	the	problems	on	the	flow.		So,	we’ve	added	another	whole	system.		Chloe	tied	the	ADT	story’s	definition,	accuracy,	and	usefulness	to	its	long-term	cost	effectiveness,	dismissing	it	in	anticipation	of	a	poor	return	on	the	ADT	initiative.		
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CEO’s	support	for	disseminating	the	CCT	presentation	The	CCT	made	a	few	revisions	to	the	deck,	calling	greater	attention	to	key	themes.		However,	we	made	no	substantive	changes	in	the	content,	offering	convincing	responses	to	Chloe’s	counterarguments.		The	review	with	Mitchell,	accompanied	by	Chloe,	lasted	57	minutes.		I	joined	by	conference	call.	I	began	with	a	general	overview	of	lessons	from	the	two	stories,	summarizing:	“ABC	employees	are	really	showing	us	the	way”	to	which	Mitchell	affirmed,	“How’s	that	for	you?”		I	continued,		We	just	have	to	find	a	way	to	listen,	and	then	figure	out	what	are	the	best	ways	in	which	we	can	support	them,	and	then	grow	the	model	further;	in	other	words,	figure	out	ways	of	replicating	the	story	(of	Flow	Unlocked)	in	many	other	contexts	within	the	hospital.	Mitchell	seemed	to	understand.		Toward	the	meeting’s	end,	he	expressed	interest	in	sharing	the	presentation	with	the	Executive	Team:	…we	just	want	to	have	a	dedicated	day	just	for	the	topic.		I	think	from	a	co-ownership	perspective…it’s	going	to	require	everybody…We	will	talk	through	culture.		We’re	going	to	talk	through	findings…and	talk	about	how	we	can	change	culture	and	use	flow	as	a	vehicle	to	be	our	first	driver,	our	first	area	of	focus.			Twice	during	Mitchell’s	statement,	Chloe	indicated	her	agreement.		Both	appeared	pleased	with	the	review	and	in	agreement	on	informing	the	Executive	Team.		Mitchell	again	reiterated	his	decision	for	an	Executive	Team	review,	identifying	two	possible	dates.		If	this	discussion	occurred,	no	CCT	member	was	invited.					
CEO’s	allusions	to	hospital	initiatives		
Raising	awareness	While	calling	attention	to	the	recommendations	and	interventions	as	part	of	the	general	overview,	I	advocated	the	creation	of	problem-solving	teams	composed	of	Executive	Team	members,	the	CCT,	and	those	staff	experiencing	bottlenecks.		These	teams	would	1)	set	improvement	goals	and	metrics	for	patient	wait	time,	2)	engage	in	cross-organizational	problem	solving	related	to	bottlenecks,	shortages,	and	other	flow	issues,	3)	implement	flow	solutions,	and	4)	evaluate	the	impact	of	those	solutions	on	the	patient	experience	as	well	as	staff.			The	presentation	had	been	underway	about	eight	minutes	when	Mitchell	asked:		Has	anyone	talked	to	you	about	one	of	our	initiatives	–	moving	
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toward	a	hospital-wide,	or	actually	what	I	would	call,	Enterprise-wide,	Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance	program?	…	It’s	going	to	include	everybody.		It’s	going	to	be	enterprise-wide…While	there	are	some	successes	(with	Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance	in	Nursing),	it	has	not	been	optimally	instituted	(throughout	the	hospital).		So,	what	we’re	going	to	borrow	is	some	off	of	their	experience.		But,	we	are	really	gonna	just	take	–	I	won’t	say	a	blank	palette	approach	to	it	–	but	we’re	really	going	to	focus	on	engaging	the	entire	house	(hospital)	around	making	it	a	patient-centered	process.	Mitchell	continued:		“But	I’m	wondering	if	we	move	to	a	Shared	Governance,	can	we	integrate	what	we	are	doing	here	(with	the	Cultural	Change	Project)	with	that	(Shared	Governance)	process?”		I	responded	in	the	affirmative,	indicating	that	we	had	some	suggestions	for	how	that	integration	might	occur.			At	that	moment,	the	cultural	pattern	embedded	in	Mitchell’s	questions	was	not	clear	to	me.		However,	in	analyzing	his	questions	later	and	comparing	them	to	other	hospital	examples,	I	recognized	that	his	questions	reflected	program-of-the-month	initiatives.		He		
• Used	language	(“actually	what	I	would	call”)	suggesting	he	considered	it	his	initiative	
• Named	the	initiative:	“Enterprise-wide,	Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance”	
• Distinguished	this	initiative:	“Enterprise-wide,	Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance”	from	its	predecessor	“Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance”	
• Viewed	his	expansion	of	the	initiative	(“engaging	the	entire	house”)	as	an	improvement	
• Tied	this	initiative	to	the	hospital	and	the	Cultural	Change	Project’s	focus:		patient-centeredness.			Noteworthy	was	how	he	changed	the	discussion’s	focus	to	his	new	initiative	–	just	eight	minutes	into	the	meeting.		As	was	soon	evident,	his	initiative	foreshadowed	an	emerging	disinterest	in	our	proposed	implementation.		Moreover,	his	push	to	change	what	others	were	advocating	–	whether	Nursing	or	CCT	–	now	appeared	to	be	part	of	a	larger	cultural	pattern.		I	had	observed	numerous	hospital	programs	during	the	project	including	the	waxing	and	waning	of	initiatives	in	communication	(e.g.,	“Crucial	Conversations,”	“AIDET”),	Nursing	(e.g.,	patient	whiteboards,	“Colleague	Health	and	Wellness”),	and	Human	Resources	(e.g.,	“Transformational	Leadership,”	“Diversity	and	Cultural	Proficiency	Assessment	Tool	for	Leaders”).		And,	Chloe’s	mention	of	
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themes	was	most	likely	connected	with	the	Contextualist	training.			
Bypassing	implementation			At	about	45	minutes	into	the	presentation,	I	offered	a	general	statement	about	organizational-culture	change	processes:	
Elizabeth:		So	not	only	do	we	need	this	extremely	strong	leadership	support,	and	leadership	involvement	in	the	change	processes	themselves,	but	we	also	have	to	have	employees	actively	involved	in	the	change	processes.		(I	invite	a	discussion	on	suggested	roles	for	proposed	flow	interventions.)		
Chloe:		Let	me	tell	you	what	we	have	done	so	far.			A:		We’ve	blown	up	the	two	flow	teams…Bettie,	David,	and	I	have	talked	about	meeting	and	huddling	to	have	one	(Mitchell:	One)	team	that	is	workable	size	that	people	can	do	to	actually	get	this	work	done.	(Mitchell:		Right!)		The	other	thing	that	we’ve	done	is	we’ve	fully	vetted	and	tried	and	know	the	weaknesses	or	strengths	of	a	number	of	different	metrics.		So,	we	are	well	on	our	way	to	getting	the	metrics	and	measurement	down	to	what	we	need	to	really	tell	the	story	of	delays	and	bottlenecks	or	whatnot…You	can’t	hide	behind	it	anymore…So,	we’ve	done	the	beginning	steps	on	these	two	pages,	Elizabeth.		When	I	first	saw	some	of	these	(recommendations),	and	we’ve	been	asked	to	talk	about	some	of	these	others	(recommendations),	I	think	we	are	well	on	our	way	to	a	beginning	effort…So,	right	on	target,	Elizabeth.		Thank	you!			About	five	minutes	later,	I	asked	Mitchell	and	Chloe	to	consider	the	following	questions:			1. “Who	will	be	responsible	for	implementation	(of	the	recommendations)?”			2. “How	will	roles	be	assigned?”			3. “Who	will	people	report	to	on	their	progress?”			4. “How	should	we	engage	the	leadership	in	general	about	change?”			Chloe	deflected,	“We	need	to	engage	the	Executive	Team	and	then	some	of	these	(responses)	need	to	flow	from	what	the	Executive	Team	feels.		Who	will	be	responsible?		Let’s	just	not	have	one	person.”		Agreeing	with	her,	Mitchell	then	reiterated	the	value	of	his	new	initiative:		This	is	where	I’m	thinking	…	To	say	we	are	doing	Enterprise-wide	Shared	Governance	is	one	thing.		If	we	just	do	it	as	a	perfunctory	exercise,	it	has	no	real	meaning.		(But)	We	can	actually	marry	these	(Cultural	Change	Project	and	Enterprise-wide	Shared	Governance)	together	and	have	Enterprise-wide	Shared	Governance	have	real	meaning,	real	functional	improvements	
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coming	out	of	it.		It’s	more	than	just	something	that	we	say	we’re	doing.	Chloe	quickly	added,	“Or	where	we	present	information.”				 I	left	the	meeting	believing	that	both	leaders	found	our	first	quarterly	report	worthwhile,	an	improvement	over	Chloe’s	initial	reaction.		At	face	value,	the	ideas	in	it	seemed	consistent	with	Mitchell’s	governance	initiative.		Yet,	as	I	revisited	the	data	set,	my	original	interpretation	of	Mitchell’s	enthusiasm	was	dampened.		No	decisions	or	substantive	follow-up	steps	related	to	implementation	were	identified.		No	attention	focused	on	discussing	solutions	to	ABC’s	cultural	problems.		There	seemed	to	be	little	appetite	for	engaging	and	empowering	employees	to	problem	solve	together	across	“siloes,”	though	Chloe	articulated	that	the	Executive	Team	would	need	to	lead	any	change	effort.			
	
Discussion	
Organizational	culture	in	stories	and	new	initiatives		Comparing	the	Flow	Story	with	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked	helps	to	isolate	cultural	themes	reflecting	the	hospital’s	current	culture	and	an	ideal	state,	respectively	(See	Figure	2).		When	understood	holistically,	the	themes	portray	important	aspects	of	the	current	and	imagined	structure	and	dynamics.		While	this	approach	is	aligned	with	earlier	analyses	of	stories	and	oral	histories	(Briody	et	al.	2012;	McKinnon	2008;	Orr	1996),	the	explicit	pairing	of	two	flow	stories	exposes	stark	cultural	differences	and	yields	distinct	cultural	models.		In	a	silo-ed,	change-resistant	culture,	individuals	and	units	optimize	for	themselves.		By	contrast,	a	collaborative,	innovative	potential-future	culture	optimizes	for	the	(organizational)	whole.											
Figure	2:		Cultural	Themes	Derived	from	Flow	Stories			
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While	some	innovations	become	embedded	in	the	organizational	culture,	others	morph	into	the	program-of-the-month	pattern.		New	initiatives	come	to	be	labeled	as	programs	of	the	month	when	employees	have	little	confidence	that	they	will	endure.		The	literature	has	documented	the	negative	effects	of	this	pattern	using	individuals	as	the	unit	of	analysis	(Herold	et	al.	2007;	Reichers	et	al.	1997)	rather	than	a	focus	on	new	initiatives.		We	believe	there	is	value	in	explaining	this	repetitious	cycle	from	a	cultural	perspective.			The	availability	and	access	to	innovative	programs	and	practices	seem	to	arise	as	a	protective	device	for	organizations	in	turbulent	industries.		Healthcare	has	followed	a	path	similar	to	the	quality	movement	of	the	1980s,	complete	with	its	quality	of	work	life	programs,	statistical	process	control	systems,	and	various	quality	training	programs	(Deming	1982).		With	the	paradigm	change	toward	patient-centeredness,	numerous	organizations	(e.g.,	theberylinstitute.org,	studergroup.com)	offer	their	programs	and	services.		At	the	same	time,	however,	the	carrot-and-stick	approach	of	the	ACA	initially	created	uncertainty	around	hospital	finances;	poorer-performing	hospitals	today	are	at	a	high	risk	of	losing	millions	of	dollars	in	CMS	reimbursement.		Any	number	of	new	initiatives	can	be	active	in	an	organization	at	any	given	time.		I	was	aware	of	more	than	10	at	various	stages	of	development;	almost	all	originated	externally.		Labeling	a	pattern	as	a	flavor	of	the	month	suggests	its	short-term	nature	and	relative	inefficiency	or	ineffectiveness.		A	new	initiative	is	transformed	into	a	flavor	of	the	month	when	1)	key	members	of	the	recipient	organization	have	not	embraced	it,	and/or	2)	it	has	fallen	out	of	use	by	organizational	members	who	adopted	it.		Sometimes,	organizational	members	draw	upon	current	initiatives	to	inspire	new	ones.		For	example,	the	CEO	emphasized	the	terminology	“Enterprise-wide	Shared	Governance”	in	lieu	of	Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance	to	distinguish	his	emergent	initiative	from	an	existing	one.		In	my	interactions	with	hospital	leaders	I	did	not	hear	them	refer	to	program-of-the-month	costs.		Yet,	Best	(2006)	cautions	that	the	cost	of	institutional	fads	should	not	be	discounted	–	both	in	implementation	and	in	the	high	likelihood	of	failure.	Hospital	leaders	representing	different	functions	(i.e.,	silos)	knew	the	Flow	Story.		Their	shared	knowledge	suggested	that	stories	were	able	to	spread	within	and	across	unit	boundaries.		Boje	(1991)	used	the	phrase	“the	storytelling	organization”	to	emphasize	important	storytelling	functions	including	sensemaking	and	introducing	change.		The	Flow	Story	involved	sensemaking,	or	what	Darrouzet	et	al.	(2010:	73)	refer	to	as	“puzzling,”	around	the	process	and	meanings	related	to	patient	flow.		Themes,	such	as	blaming,	resistance,	and	workarounds,	symbolize	employee	frustration	and	coping	strategies	aligned	with	the	sensemaking	or	puzzling.		In	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked,	change	was	introduced	in	a	celebratory	fashion	–	replete	with	excitement.	
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Stories	can	be	dismissed	as	irrelevant,	inappropriate,	or	lacking	credibility.		Initially,	the	VP	was	upset	by	the	messages	conveyed	in	both	stories.		Her	expectations	for	how	patient	flow	was	being	managed	(in	the	Flow	Story),	or	should	be	managed	(in	the	Story	of	Flow	Unlocked),	were	not	met.		Her	reactions	incorporated	blaming	behavior.		She	faulted	leaders	for	inaction	in	addressing	flow,	and	the	ADT	for	its	attempted	launch,	which	she	anticipated	would	fail.		Fortunately,	the	CCT	prevailed	by	challenging	her	reasoning.		Ultimately,	she	allowed	the	stories	to	remain	part	of	the	first	quarterly	report,	though	she	had	the	power	to	suppress	the	analyses	and	implications	generated	from	the	stories	–	and	action	which	would	have	led	to	cultural	loss.				
The	stage-based	characteristics	of	the	Program	of	the	Month	New	initiatives	are	often	unveiled	as	innovations,	defined	as	“an	idea,	practice	or	object	that	is	perceived	as	new	by	an	individual	or	other	unit	of	adoption”	(Rogers	2003:	12).		Such	activity	occurs	during	stage	1.		We	found	some	preference	for	a	new	initiative	to	be	internally	consistent	with	a	current	or	past	one,	yet	distinctive	in	its	own	right:			
• The	VP	led	the	Contextualist	training	that	was	introduced	a	couple	of	years	before	the	Cultural	Change	Project	started.			
• The	VP	proposed	a	reconfiguration	of	the	CCT’s	problem-solving	teams	into	existing	hospital	committees	and	councils.			
• The	CEO’s	proposed	Enterprise-wide	Shared	Governance	was	directly	connected	to	Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance.			In	stage	2,	new	initiatives	often	experience	resistance	in	permeating	unit	boundaries.		Structural	differentiation	within	silo-ed	organizations	is	consistent	with	an	“’us	versus	them’	mindset”	(Diamond	et	al.	2004:	46)	and	with	a	“parallel	but	minimally	interactive	work	environment”	(Curtis	and	Shannon	2006:	16).		It	was	rare	for	any	hospital	initiative	to	be	associated	with	more	than	one	unit.		For	example,	Interdisciplinary	Shared	Governance	was	associated	with	Nursing	but	did	not	spread	beyond	it.		Similarly,	AIDET	was	embraced	by	Environmental	Services	but	was	thoroughly	resisted	by	Nursing.		If	two	or	more	units	reported	to	the	same	individual,	the	expanded	group	of	units	might	adopt	the	new	initiative,	as	was	the	case	with	both	Environmental	Services	and	Dietary	that	supported	the	AIDET	initiative.	Cultural	loss,	a	process	tied	to	vanishing	cultural	elements	(Ferraro	and	Briody	2017),	is	part	of	the	program-of-the-month	phenomenon.		During	stage	3,	cracks	in	this	process	often	foreshadow	the	weakening	of	an	initiative,	which	eventually	leads	to	its	displacement	and	disappearance.		A	staff	member	reported	one	such	crack,	stating	that	the	ADT	had	been	“used	as	a	holdover	area”	when	patient	capacity	was	at	its	highest.		Such	situations	raise	doubts	and	create	ambiguity.		Sometimes	
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an	initiative	can	recover	by	arresting	the	specific	disruption	and	shoring	up	support	structures.		In	other	instances,	it	cannot:		approximately	five	months	after	the	Cultural	Change	Project	ended,	the	ADT	unit	was	renamed	and	repurposed	to	care	for	cardiac	patients.		As	such,	ADT	was	no	longer	an	innovation,	but	had	drifted	back	to	an	earlier	state.		Stories	might	continue	to	capture	its	former	glory,	but	as	organizational	memory	fades,	the	ADT	becomes	part	of	cultural	loss.				 Finally,	stage	4	involves	the	launch	of	another	innovation.		ABC	Hospital	hired	a	marketing	consultant	who	offered	“seven	steps	toward	providing	quality	patient	care”	shortly	after	the	Cultural	Change	Project	ended;	the	tenure	of	this	consultant	was	brief.		Initiative	overlap	highlights	the	ongoing	processes	of	continuity	and	change	when	newer	initiatives	are	purposely	built	on	older	ones.		
Program-of-the-Month	complexity	Best	(2006)	identifies	various	images	(e.g.,	steps,	waves,	cycles,	a	pendulum)	linked	to	the	flavor-of-the-month	phenomenon.		Yet,	he	expresses	dissatisfaction	with	these	visuals	because	they	are	unable	to	take	into	account	the	complexity	associated	with	innovative	efforts.		Let’s	return	briefly	to	Figure	1	which	illustrates	some	of	the	complexity	associated	with	our	fieldwork:	
• Board,	CEO,	and	cultural-change	meetings	involving	the	VP	and	hospital	leaders	ended	(by	second	quarter)		
• PowerPoint	reports	changed	from	verbal	communication	based	on	a	deck	to	submission	of	the	deck	without	an	opportunity	to	discuss	with	leaders	(between	second	and	third	quarters)	
• VP	input	was	conveyed	“indirectly”	through	a	member	of	the	CCT	to	me;	this	pattern	was	evident	throughout	2013,	but	became	especially	prominent	as	formal	interactions	with	hospital	leaders	ceased.	Yet,	this	complexity	is	useful.		Such	communication	activity	is	reminiscent	of	the	movement	of	waves	along	a	shore,	some	appearing	and	disappearing	suddenly,	with	others	gathering	strength	up	to	a	point	until	they	too	end.		Overall,	Figure	1	illustrates	hospital	leader	waning	interest	and	disengagement	from	an	in-house	initiative	over	the	course	of	the	project.		Even	the	VP	retreats	from	her	interactions	with	me,	preferring	instead	to	share	information	indirectly	through	a	CCT	member.			Indeed,	the	communications	depicted	in	Figure	1	seem	to	be	a	miniature	version	of	the	broader	flavor-of-the-month	pattern	that	is	pervasive	in	ABC	Hospital	culture.					
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Value	ascribed	to	evidence		Data,	analyses,	narratives,	and	examples	are	always	subject	to	interpretation.		The	VP	exhibited	negative	reactions	to	the	story	messages,	while	the	CEO	seemed	to	accept	them.		Their	organizational	roles	are	largely	predictive.		The	CEO’s	time	and	energy	were	spent	largely	building	external	partnerships	and	focusing	on	population	health.		Developing	a	strategic	plan,	working	on	the	“cutting	edge,”	and	creating	“legacy”	were	among	his	key	hospital	goals.		By	contrast,	day-to-day	hospital	operations	were	left	to	Executive	Team	members	to	manage	from	their	individual	functions.		As	VP	of	continuous	improvement,	our	sponsor	had	a	visible	stake	in	decisions	related	to	patient	flow,	while	the	CEO	did	not.		She	also	had	to	join	hands	with	Nursing	on	flow,	an	issue	where	functional	leaders	held	competing	priorities	(e.g.,	reducing	patient	wait	time,	limiting	cost).	Evidence	may	be	used	in	different	ways.		The	VP	singled	out	two	CCT	recommendations	at	the	review	with	the	CEO.		She	argued	they	had	“done	the	beginning	steps”	for	cultural	change,	indicating,	“We’ve	blown	up	the	two	flow	teams”	and	“vetted…a	number	of	different	metrics.”		Her	argument	used	CCT	evidence	as	confirmation	that	the	hospital	was	in	lock	step	with	the	recommendations:	“So,	right	on	target,	Elizabeth.		Thank	you!”		Indeed,	she	suggested	that	action	was	now	underway	and	consistent	with	the	recommendations.		The	CCT’s	interpretation	of	her	statements	ran	counter	to	her	view.		Implementation	science	also	has	faced	this	issue	of	beliefs	and	perceptions,	most	recently	in	“de-implementation”	or	abandonment	of	practices	that	are	not	evidence-based	(Prasad	and	Ioannidis	2014;	Montini	and	Graham	2015).				
Strategies	to	encourage	change	in	silo-ed	organizations	Clues	from	the	two	stories	and	the	program-of-the-month	pattern	systematically	point	to	cross-unit	collaboration	as	a	critical	factor	in	promoting	organizational-culture	change.		Bottlenecks	appear	at	the	boundaries	where	“handoffs”	occur	and	receiving	staff	scramble	to	accommodate	them	or	ignore	them	–	at	least	in	the	short	run.		The	best	way	to	break	the	bottleneck	begins	with	cross-unit	collaboration	founded	on	trust,	but	that	change	process	does	not	end	there.			Lencioni’s	(2006)	prescriptive	model	in	which	all	organizational	members	share	a	goal,	follow	a	set	of	objectives,	and	use	common	metrics	are	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	conditions,	to	address	organizational-change	issues.		Work	practices	and	processes	must	change	across	the	organization	so	that	boundaries	(e.g.,	disciplinary,	functional)	do	not	act	as	impediments	(Cilliers	and	Greyvenstein	2012;	Margalit	et	al.	2009).		The	use	of	incentives	and	sanctions	can	encourage	the	desired	behaviors	–	both	for	individuals	and	groups	(Newhouse	and	Spring	2010;	Zorich	et	al.	2008).		Commitment	to	the	changes	at	all	organizational	levels	
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(Cummings	and	Worley	2015),	especially	leadership	(Armenakis	and	Harris	2009)	can	also	help.		Just	as	no	“magic	bullet”	exists	to	address	patient	flow,	no	simple	solution	can	tackle	the	problems	faced	by	silo-ed	organizations.	Under	current	conditions,	neither	the	VP’s	designation	of	a	single	flow	committee,	nor	the	CEO’s	call	for	“house-wide”	implementation,	will	bear	fruit.		Those	closest	to	the	work	should	be	actively	engaged,	working	together	rather	than	at	cross-purposes.		When	employees	come	to	believe	that	their	ideas	matter,	their	attitudes	shift	toward	an	embrace	of	change	(Armenakis	and	Harris	2009).		Without	modifying	hospital	structures,	processes,	and	interactions,	new	initiatives	will	continue	to	face	near-certain	demise.			
Expanding	the	concept	of	implementation	practice	to	include	failure	What	do	the	ADT	and	Cultural	Change	Project	share	in	common?		Both	
• Necessitated	building	rapport	with	hospital	employees	and	reliance	on	their	goodwill	
• Engaged	employee	knowledge	and	efforts	–	directly	or	indirectly	
• Had	as	their	goal	improving	patient	centeredness	
• Were	experiments	to	effect	organizational-culture	change,	revealing	alternatives	to	the	status	quo	
• Required	alternative	work	practices	and	structures	for	accommodating	that	work	
• Cost	money	but	demonstrated	salient	benefits	in	patient	care	and	staff	satisfaction	
• Faced	long-term	resistance	from	at	least	some	senior	leaders,	and	noteworthy	acceptance	from	remaining	organizational	members	
• Experienced	a	limited	impact	in	changing	hospital	culture.	These	characteristics	reflect	five	features	reported	by	Briody	and	Erickson	(2017:	34-35)	to	help	ensure	implementation	or	“system-wide	innovation	success:”	collaboration,	leadership	buy-in,	structural	change,	work	practice	change,	and	evidence	of	benefit.		Yet	these	five	features	do	not	fully	explain	why	the	ADT	and	Cultural	Change	Project	were	not	successful	in	the	long-term.	The	explanation,	I	believe,	is	that	the	ADT	and	the	Cultural	Change	Project	became	entwined	in	the	program-of-the-month	cycle.		Key	organizational	stakeholders	–	particularly	leaders	–	ultimately	rejected	CCT	efforts,	despite	denouncing	programs	of	the	month.		This	critical	error	built	on	existing	cynicism	(Wanous	et	al.	2004;	Reichers	et	al.	1997)	pertaining	to	implementation	of	organizational-culture	change.		Cynicism	
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has	corrosive	effects	on	an	organization’s	ability	to	adapt	and	innovate.		It	can	decimate	employee	commitment	to	the	organization	and	to	its	customers.		It	can	quell	creativity.		It	can	resist	innovation.		It	can	undermine,	for	the	long-term,	all	future	efforts	to	help	the	organization	improve	and	thrive.		ABC	leadership’s	refusal	to	move	forward	with	organizational-culture	change,	developed	hand-in-hand	with	six	competent	hospital	professionals	(i.e.,	CCT),	dashed	staff	hopes	for	a	collaborative	work	culture	providing	focused	and	effective	patient-centric	care.	 This	leadership	decision	was	also	tied	to	a	lack	of	attention	to	organizational-culture	issues	generally.		For	example,	despite	identifying	accountability	as	a	core	value,	we	discovered	few	consequences	(Kennedy	et	al.	2014;	O’Hagan	and	Persaud	2009)	for	either	inadequate	performance	or	active	resistance	to	organizational	expectations.		ABC	Hospital	had	no	mechanisms	in	place	to	analyze	and	share	lessons	learned,	and	as	such	was	poorly	positioned	to	learn	from	its	mistakes.		Consequently,	hospital	leaders	initiated	and	cycled	through	program	after	program,	thereby	accounting	for	the	slow	pace	of	sustained	change,	and	avoiding	a	commitment	to	continuous	organizational	improvement.			
Future	Directions	What	can	be	done	about	the	woes	of	implementation	practice?		To	address	this	question	requires	attention	to	our	definition	–	the	planning	and	execution	of	organizational	change	by	key	stakeholders.		The	two	crucial	meetings	with	the	VP	and	CEO	–	in	February	and	March	2013	–	sent	strong	signals	that	ABC	Hospital	leaders	were	reticent	to	engage	in	cultural	change.		We	recognized	their	reluctance	at	the	time,	but	believed	later	opportunities	to	unify	the	Leadership	Team	around	the	concept	of	patient-centeredness	would	emerge.		Unfortunately,	we	gambled	and	lost	in	helping	ABC	change	in	the	way	it	initially	indicated	it	wanted	to	change.		We	had	to	come	to	terms	with	the	CCT	representing	only	one	actor	in	the	cultural-change	process,	a	process	that	we	could	not	lead.		The	CCT’s	many	roles	(e.g.,	researchers,	guides,	translators,	implementers)	entailed	working	alongside	others	as	one	stakeholder	among	many	others.		Without	the	cooperation	and	collaboration	of	other	key	stakeholders,	implementation	practice	would	remain	elusive.	On	the	other	hand,	the	CCT	project	led	to	some	additional	questions:	
• Why	did	the	policy	change	in	CMS	reimbursement	–	a	seemingly-important	change	in	organizational	incentives	–	not	lead	to	any	durable	changes	in	the	metrics	(e.g.,	improved	clinical	outcomes,	higher	patient	satisfaction)?			
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• To	what	extent	does	resistance	to	change	vary	by	industry,	organization,	size,	reputation,	budgetary	constraints,	and	customer	characteristics,	among	others?	
• Under	what	conditions	can	levers	be	applied	to	enhance	the	likelihood	of	cultural	change	given	client	resistance	and/or	the	program-of-the-month	pattern?			Another	question	also	merits	exploration:		Do	programs	of	the	month	and	other	failed	initiatives	serve	some	purpose	beyond	attempted	innovation?		If	we	consider	the	set	of	initiatives	active	at	ABC	during	the	Cultural	Change	Project,	we	learn	that	they	are	not	just	reflective	of	the	latest	fad,	but	perform	an	important	communication	function.		They	send	both	explicit	and	implicit	messages	to	stakeholder	groups	(e.g.,	internal	units,	organizational	leadership,	government	agencies).		For	example,	creating	the	ADT	seems	to	have	been	a	sincere	attempt	at	improving	patient	care,	as	well	as	a	reaction	to	hospital	leadership	inaction.		By	establishing	this	unit,	ED	leaders	were	able	to	garner	resources	and	attention	to	patient	flow	–	at	least	while	the	ADT	was	in	operation	–	thereby	improving	the	patient	experience	temporarily.	When	new	initiatives	morph	into	programs	of	the	month,	they	can	still	leave	their	mark	on	organizational	stakeholders	by	accomplishing	some	goals.		New	initiatives	perform	a	communication	function	that	I	call	“impression	management”	in	which	some	aspects	of	an	issue	are	highlighted,	while	others	are	not	mentioned,	downplayed,	or	obscured.		The	Cultural	Change	Project	had	enthusiastic	senior	leadership	support	initially.		Indeed,	for	eight	months	our	VP	and	CEO	sponsors	championed	the	project	with	ABC’s	Board	because	it	would	help	lead	to	a	patient-centric	culture	and	higher	HCAHPS	scores.		Our	project	sponsors	left	a	
positive	impression	with	the	Board	about	our	work,	backed	up	by	our	research	results	and	recommendations.			Yet,	sometime	after	our	April	Board	review,	communication	with	the	Board	was	filtered	through	our	sponsors.		The	CCT	was	never	again	asked	to	present	any	subsequent	results	to	hospital	leaders	and	no	implementation	of	its	work	occurred.		Our	sponsors’	view	of	the	Cultural	Change	Project	had	changed,	and	with	it,	their	management	of	the	Board’s	understanding.		Still,	boards	generally	leave	an	organization’s	administration	to	the	CEO	and	his/her	direct	reports,	focusing	instead	on	strategic	matters	(e.g.,	long-term	growth).		Boards	have	little	incentive	to	intervene	in	day-to-day	operations,	as	long	as	the	future	appears	bright.		So,	while	ABC’s	patient	satisfaction	scores	had	not	improved,	thereby	contributing	to	lower	CMS	reimbursement,	it	was	not	enough	at	the	time	to	cause	ABC’s	Board	undue	worry.			In	the	event	that	the	Board	requested	a	subsequent	update,	the	discussion	could	be	framed	as	what	was	accomplished,	rather	than	what	was	not	accomplished.		There	would	be	no	need	to	mention	
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implementation,	let	alone	engage	in	implementation.		Leaving	the	impression	that	accomplishments	had	been	achieved,	supported	by	numerous	reports,	would	likely	satisfy	the	Board.		If	asked	about	next	steps,	it	would	be	easy	to	point	out	that	the	hospital	was	moving	on…to	
another	exciting	initiative.		The	status	quo	would	remain	intact	and	there	would	be	no	reason	or	incentive	to	set	in	motion	organizational-culture	changes	–	even	to	fix	flow	and	to	improve	patient	care.		Future	research	might	consider	whether	unstated	ancillary	benefits	to	the	initiators	or	the	organization	explain	the	persistence	of	the	program-of-the-month	pattern	(and	their	failures)	across	organizations	of	different	types	and	sizes.			
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